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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

case of State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers,12 wherein an

appellate court of Missouri held that a revenue law is not penal, for a
revenue law defines the extent of the citizen's pecuniary obligation to the
state, in return for the protection afforded him by the state; while the sole
object of a penal law is to punish a wrongdoer. The court then concluded
that a suit for the collection of taxes was an action in the nature of debt for
moneys due, and should be enforceable in a sister state. These conclusions
formed the basis for the result reached by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in the instant case.
After forty-four years of silence in the Illinois law on the subject, the
instant case now exhibits a purpose on the part of the Supreme Court of
Illinois to follow the modern and more enlightened viewpoint. Inasmuch
as the action for the collection of taxes due a sister state is an action in
the nature of debt for moneys due, the simplest ideas of comity would seem
to compel the enforcement of the revenue laws of the sister state. The
contrary doctrine was the product of an earlier commercial world where
two sovereigns were in bitter political and economic competition. Such a
doctrine has no place in a union of states such as the United States. A taxpayer who enjoys the protection of the government of a particular state
should bear his share of the expense of maintaining that government and
should not be allowed to escape this obligation by crossing state lines.
J. SINGER

EMINENT

DOMAIN-RMEDIES

OF

OWNERS

OF

PROPFiRTY-WHIETHER

FREQUENT Low FLIGHTS OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH
MUNICIPALLY

OPERATED

AIRPORT

AMOUNT

TO

APPROPRIATION

OF

SUCH

UsE-A new question regarding the rights of an
owner of realty to the airspace above his property has been answered by
the Supreme Court of Washington as a result of its decision in the case of
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle.' Therein, owners of both vacant and improved realty located in the approach area of a municipally owned airport
sought to hold the municipality 2 liable for appropriating3 their property
PROPERTY TO A PUBLIC

Conflict of Laws (1948 Supp.), § 610, pp. 174-5, no opinion is expressly stated but
it is said therein that the more desirable result would be to enforce foreign

revenue laws.

12 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S. W. (2d) 919 (1946).
1 - Wash. -, 329 P. (2d) 211 (1959). Mallery, J. filed a dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Hill, C.J., and Donworth and Ott, JJ.
2 The plaintiffs also sought to hold all scheduled airlines using the airport liable,
but the municipality Is the only defendant in this appeal because the airlines have
made a settlement with the plaintiffs.
3 A nuisance theory of liability and a trespass theory of liability were also set
forth in the complaint, but consideration of these theories is outside the scope of

this paper.
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by reason of frequent low flights4 over said property. Although the municipality operated no airplanes, the plaintiffs alleged that it was responsible
for the frequent low flights because the airport facilities were inadequate.
A demurrer by the municipality was overruled as to the owners of improved land but was sustained as to the owners of vacant land. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the order sustaining the
demurrer when it concluded that there was a sufficient taking to amount to
an appropriation as to vacant land as well as to improved land.
The property rights of landowners in the airspace above their land
have recently required re-examination because of the development of
modern air transportation. The common law theory as to the ownership of
airspace and the legal incidents thereof is summarized in the maxim "cujus
est solum est usque ad coelum", literally, he who owns the soil owns everything above. 5 The ad coelum maxim, however, emanated from cases where
the operative facts and conditions were close to the earth as where overhanging structures were erected on adjoining land. While the theory it
embodies is still appropriate when applied in cases of overhanging structures, it does not adequately solve cases involving modern air transportation. As a practical matter, all courts have recognized that it is mere
dictum with relation to such cases and that the social welfare of the community would be impaired by extending it to such cases.6
While it has been recognized that the relationship of modern air trailsportation to property rights of landowners in airspace is a new problem
for which a new solution is needed, the courts have not been entirely in
accord as to what the complete solution should be. They have been in substantial agreement that property rights in superjacent airspace must be
based upon occupancy, use and enjoyment thereof. To elaborate, most
courts agree that the landowner's rights cannot exceed his ability to utilize
the superjacent airspace and that the altitude to which they extend there7
fore depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
4 The noise attendant to flights and warm-up and the inherent fear resulting from
such flights were also alleged in the complaint to show a taking of private property.
5 I Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England L. 1 C. 1 Sect. 1, at 4a (First
American Edition, 1853).
6 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 41 F. (2d) 929 (1930), modified on
other grounds on appeal in 55 F. (2d) 201 (1932), 83 A. L. R. 319; Cory v. Physical
Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (1936), affirmed on appeal on other grounds in
88 F. (2d) 411 (1937); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817
(1934), 99 A. L. R. 158.
7 United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. C. 1062 (1946);
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (1936), certiorari denied in 300
U. S. 654, 81 L. Ed. 865, 57 S. C. 431 (1936) ; Guith v. Consumers Power Company,
36 F. Supp. 21 (1940): Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (1936),
affirmed on appeal on other grounds in 88 F. (2d) 411 (1937) ; Brandes v. Mitterling,
67 Ariz. 349. 196 P. (2d) 464 (1948) ; Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. (2d) 825. 243 P.
(2d) 497 (1952); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 D. Ch. 225, 27 A. (2d) 87 (1942):
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Substantially all courts further agree that the landowner has property
rights in airspace when he is presently and actually occupying, using and
enjoying it." But the point at which the courts depart is crucial to the
principal case. Some courts have contended that the landowner has property rights in as much airspace as he is able to occupy or use in the enjoyment of his land regardless of whether such use is an accomplished fact.
This view is based upon the possible effective possession theory under which
it is not decisive that the landowner does not at present make possible
effective possession a realized occupation. Other courts have contended
that the landowner owns only the airspace he utilizes."° This view is based
upon the theory that the law should not uphold attempts of landowners to
stake out unused spaces in the air in order to protect some future contemplated use. The relative merits of the possible effective possession theory
are that it adheres as closely as is practicable to the common law point of
view and, by so doing, offers greater protection to the right of the ownership of private property which is basic to American law. The relative
merits of the actual use, occupancy and enjoyment theory are that it more
effectively promotes the public welfare by facilitating the development of
modern air transportation and it does this without encroaching upon the
owner's right to presently use his property. In the principal case, the
court adopted the former theory and it therefore held that the owners of
vacant land did have property rights in the superjacent airspace above
their land. If it had adopted the latter theory, it would seem that it would
have held that the owners of vacant land had no such property rights.
The question which next arises is whether these property rights were
taken under the eminent domain power so that the owner of the land has a
constitutional right to just compensation. While there are several cases
proceeding on a nuisance theory and several more proceeding on a trespass
Delta Air Corporation v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942), 140 A. L. R.
1352; Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934), 99 A. L. R.
158; Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N. J. Super. 346, 61 A. (2d) 645 (1948);
Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, 385 Pa. 520, 123 A. (2d) 636
(1956) ; Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491 (1955) ; Crew
v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A. (2d) 179 (1948).
8 See cases cited in note 7, ante.
9 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 41 F. (2d) 929 (1930), modified on
other grounds on appeal in 55 F. (2d) 201 (1932), 83 A. L. R. 319; Guith v.
Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (1940) ; Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14
F. Supp. 977 (1936), affirmed on appeal on other grounds in 88 F. (2d) 411 (1937):
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934), 99 A. L. R. 158;
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930), 69
A. L. R. 300.
10 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (1936), certiorari denied in
300 U. .. 654, 81 L. Ed. 865, 57 S. C. 431 (1936) ; Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz.
349. 196 P. (2d) 464 (1948) ; Vanderslice v. Shawn. 26 D. Ch. 225, 27 A. (2d) 87
(1942) : Delta Air Corporation v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942).
140 A. L. R. 1352.
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theory, there are almost none proceeding on a taking theory. The first case
in which the opinion of the court indicated that it might have been possible
to proceed on a taking theory was in the case of Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta." Therein, the court raised the question of whether or not the
plaintiff might have been able to recover for permanent injury to his real
estate under the constitutional provision against the taking of private
property for public purposes without adequate compensation being first
paid. The court did not answer the question, however, because the plaintiff
did not seek recovery upon that theory.
The first case in which it was held that there was a taking was in the
case of United States v. Causby.12 Therein, it was held that a landowner
has a right to compensation by virtue of the Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution if the approach to the runways of a federal airport
is such that frequent low flights directly interfere with the use of his
land. It is to be noted that both the Thrasher case and the Causby case
proceed upon the possible effective possession theory and that there is
dicta in the Causby case indicating that frequent low flights causing a
diminution in the value of vacant land woulld be the basis for a cause of
action for a taking of vacant land. More recently, dicta in the case of
Gardner v. County of Allegheny 13 indicated that the holding in the Causby
case would be highly persuasive upon state courts. Therein, the court
said that it is as clear as crystal under the authority of the Causby case
that flights over private land which are so low and so frequent as to be
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land amount to a taking. In the principal case, the court relied mainly
upon the Causby case in deciding that property rights in superjacent airspace had been taken under the eminent domain power so that the owner
of land had a constitutional right to just compensation. By so doing, the
court extended the rule of the Causby case to municipally owned airports.
In addition, the holding of the court was in accord with the dicta in the
Causby case stating that a cause of action exists for a taking of superjacent airspace over vacant land.
By deciding that the taking of an easement
possible effective possession of owners of vacant
flights was a taking requiring just compensation,
Washington strengthened the rights of property

of airspace within the
land by frequent low
the Supreme Court of
owners. In so doing,

1178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934), 99 A. L. R. 158. Russell, C. J. concurred in

a separate opinion and Atkinson, J. concurred in result in a separate opinion.

12 328 U. S. 256, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. C. 1062 (1946). Black, J. wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Burton, J. joined. Jackson, J. took no part.
13 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491 (1955). The case was actually decided on juris-

dictional grounds.
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it solved a new problem without departing from principles basic to American law. The right to the ownership of private property and to the free
use and enjoyment thereof was preserved. At the same time, the authority
of the government to take private property for the promotion of the public
welfare was recognized and merely subjected to the usual due process
requirement.
H. Q. ROHDE

